Bordering on Conventional: The Politics of Iraqi Resettlement to the US and Europe, 2003–2011 by Berman, Chantal E.
Bordering on Conventional: 
The Politics of Iraqi Resettlement 
to the US and Europe, 2003–2011
Chantal E. Berman
Abstract
Of some 2.5 million Iraqi citizens internationally displaced 
in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom, less than 100,000 
have achieved permanent international resettlement. Th is 
paper compares US and EU policies regulating the selection 
and admission of Iraqi refugees since 2003, focusing on the 
divergent political priorities and structural considerations 
underpinning variations in resettlement levels during this 
time. I argue that US resettlement of Iraqi refugees is pri-
marily an element of foreign policy, defi ned by strategic 
objectives in Iraq and the surrounding region, whereas 
admissions to the EU refl ect ongoing intra-European 
debates surrounding the construction and modifi cation of 
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Whereas 
resettlement to the US increased drastically following a 
“strategic” reframing of the Iraqi refugee crisis in 2007, fail-
ures in the implementation of CEAS’s “standardization” 
agenda, compounded by enhanced European restrictions 
on refugee movement, have limited Iraqi admissions to 
Europe during this time.
Résumé
Des quelques 2,5 millions de citoyens irakiens déplacés 
internationalement suite à l’Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
moins de 100 000 ont réussi leur réinstallation permanente 
dans un autre pays. Cet article compare les politiques amé-
ricaines et européennes réglementant la sélection et l’ad-
mission des réfugiés irakiens depuis 2003. On s’y concentre 
sur les diff érences de priorités politiques et de considéra-
tions structurelles qui sous-tendent les diff érences dans le 
nombre de réfugiés installés. On avance que l’installation 
des réfugiés irakiens aux États-Unis relève surtout d’une 
politique des étrangers défi nie par des objectifs stratégi-
ques en Irak et au Moyen Orient. En comparaison, leur 
admission en Europe dépend des débats européens sur la 
construction et la modifi cation du Régime d’asile européen 
commun (RAEC). Alors que les États-Unis accueillaient 
beaucoup plus de réfugiés irakiens suite à une refonte stra-
tégique de leurs politiques en réponse à la crise des réfu-
giés de 2007, au même moment, les échecs dans la mise 
en place des objectifs standardisés du RAEC, de pair avec 
les restrictions européennes sur le mouvement des réfugiés, 
ont limité l’admission de réfugiés irakiens en Europe.
Introduction
June 2011 marked the 60th anniversary of the UN 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which laid 
down protective standards for displaced Europeans in the 
post-war era and established refugee non-refoulement as a 
premier principle of contemporary international law. Along 
with its 1967 Protocol, the Convention has spawned a host 
of diverse legislation in signatory states1 pertaining to the 
selection and integration of foreign refugees. Individual 
resettlement policies vary widely in the number of refugees 
accepted annually and in the character of rights and servi-
ces available to new migrants, and each national resettle-
ment program is subject to a unique set of fi scal and polit-
ical prerogatives.
Whereas the original European “refugees” found ample 
opportunities for life, work, and citizenship in the United 
States and Western Europe, their experience has been sel-
dom replicated in the Convention’s 60-year history. Today’s 
refugees—some 15.4 million of them worldwide, according 
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to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR)2—face fi rst-world resettlement quotas that pale 
in comparison to demonstrated need. Iraqis who have fl ed 
personal and political violence since the American invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 are no exception.
Th ough accurate numbers are diffi  cult to come by, the 
Congressional Research Service estimates that up to 2.5 
million Iraqis have sought international refuge since 2003,3 
with a vast majority still living precariously in Iraq’s neigh-
bouring states. Studies show that a preponderance of Iraqi 
refugees oppose returning to Iraq in the near future,4 and 
UNHCR has corroborated their position in several reports 
outlining the hardships of Iraqis who prematurely repatri-
ate.5 Recent multinational aid programs6 have sought to 
ameliorate the living conditions of displaced Iraqis as they 
await a permanent solution, but as the ongoing sociopolit-
ical costs of refugee hosting produce more restrictive poli-
cies in Syria and Jordan, Iraqis trapped in the region are 
becoming more vulnerable to marginalization and abuse. 
Th e challenge for the international community remains to 
permanently resettle those Iraqis who are unable to inte-
grate locally and unwilling to return to Iraq.
In this article, I compare the Iraqi resettlement eff orts 
of the United States and the European Union since 2003, 
highlighting divergence in the fundamental political prior-
ities underpinning admissions quotas, asylum recognition 
criteria, and other policy choices impacting the admis-
sion of Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers. I argue that US 
resettlement of Iraqi refugees is primarily an element of for-
eign policy, defi ned by strategic objectives in Iraq and the 
surrounding region, whereas admissions to the EU refl ect 
ongoing intra-European debates surrounding the construc-
tion and modifi cation of the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS). Whereas the reframing of Iraqi resettle-
ment as a matter of “strategic interest” caused a drastic 
increase in US Iraqi admissions aft er 2007, persistent fail-
ures in the implementation of CEAS’s “standardization” 
agenda, compounded by enhanced restrictions on refugee 
movement, have resulted in an overall stagnation of Iraqi 
admissions to Europe.
Th e Strategic Dimensions of Resettlement: Iraqi 
Refugees and Foreign Policy in the US
Accounting for some two-thirds of UNHCR’s annual 
global resettlement,7 the United States Refugee Admissions 
Program (USRAP) is by far the world’s largest third-coun-
try resettlement scheme. Th e US has been resettling Iraqis 
since the early 1990s, with over 100,000 resettled as of May 
2011;8 18,838 were accepted for resettlement in FY 2009, 
and another 18,016 arrived in FY 2010.9 Yet a review of Iraqi 
resettlement levels in the post-invasion era reveals a severe 
lull in resettlement levels corresponding with the apex 
of Iraq’s civil war and the heights of the Iraqi emigration, 
precisely as wide refugee fl ows compounded by a scarcity 
of foreign aid and resettlement options forced major host 
states such as Syria and Jordan to shut their borders with 
Iraq.10 Explaining this seemingly counterproductive dearth 
of resettlement options at a time of mounting need requires 
an understanding of the ways in which US resettlement 
policy has traditionally been dictated by broader foreign 
policy goals.
America’s unique position of relative geographical isola-
tion and her consequent reliance on overseas refugee pro-
cessing has allowed successive administrations to manage 
the nationalities, ethnic identities, educational backgrounds, 
and other qualities of refugees arriving on US shores. Th e 
US Executive Branch establishes yearly admissions quotas 
for each major sending state, making a refugee’s national-
ity the single most important factor determining his or 
her chances of achieving US resettlement. Historically, 
the formulation of these quotas has relied heavily on an 
administration’s perception of the strategic benefi ts of 
resettlement, which range from shaming the sending state 
to forestalling the spread of confl ict via militant refugees. 
Resettlement programs during the Cold War prioritized 
refugees from communist countries in Eastern Europe and 
Asia while maintaining lower quotas for refugees of stra-
tegically unimportant wars in the Middle East and Africa.11 
Similarly, the US admitted some 30,000 Iraqi opponents of 
the Ba’ath regime during the sanctions period in Iraq,12 at 
an average yearly resettlement rate far outstripping that of 
the 2003–2007 period.
Perhaps most importantly, US resettlement levels tend to 
correlate negatively with ongoing US military engagement 
in a particular sending state, regardless of the severity of 
the refugee crisis in question. It was not until aft er the US 
withdrawal from Vietnam that America began the process 
of resettling some 322,000 Indochinese refugees;13 likewise, 
resettlement from both Iraq and Afghanistan decreased 
signifi cantly aft er the initial US invasions of those coun-
tries.14 Refugee resettlement (or a calculated lack thereof) 
remains one tool among many in the diplomatic and stra-
tegic arsenal of the United States on a global scale.
In this section, I discuss the foreign policy bias apparent 
in US policy towards Iraqi refugee resettlement since 2003, 
identifying a “reframing” of the refugee discourse towards 
one of strategic concern in 2007–2008, and fi nally analyz-
ing structural problems that cause actual Iraqi arrivals to 
frequently fall short of stated quotas.
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US Admissions 2003–2007: Th e “Refugee Crisis” Th at 
Wasn’t
Th e experimental nature of Operation Iraqi Freedom—and 
the purported applicability of regime change followed by 
state building as a model for future US engagements in the 
region—provided strong impetus for the Bush administra-
tion to downplay the humanitarian costs of the Iraq war. As 
Sanders and Smith of the Brookings Institution wrote in a 
2007 article, “Addressing the Iraqi refugee crisis implies an 
acknowledgement that the US-led coalition and the Iraqi 
government have been unable to provide security within the 
country.”15 Th e Bush administration employed a strategy of 
public denial for as long as politically expedient: instead 
of applauding nearby states for providing safe havens, the 
Bush administration accused Syria of harbouring “insur-
gent terrorists,”16 implying that Iraqis fl eeing the country 
were doing so for reasons other than personal safety. UN 
Ambassador John Bolton denied any correlation between 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Iraqi refugee crisis;17 
administration offi  cials responded to criticism of this pos-
ition by explaining that Iraqi displacement “predates the 
current confl ict.”18 Funding followed suit; in 2007, the US 
spent just under $200 million on displaced Iraqis—less, as 
Sanders and Smith pointed out, than the roughly $280 mil-
lion spent per day on the Iraq war.19
Despite dire UNHCR predictions to the contrary, the 
initial invasion of Iraq failed to produce more than several 
thousand refugees, mainly wealthy ex-Ba’athists fl eeing in 
comfort to Syria, Jordan, and the Gulf States.20 Outfl ow of 
Iraqis increased in response to US operations in Fallujah in 
2004 and peaked dramatically in 2006 and 2007, as large 
portions of Iraq disintegrated into sectarian violence fol-
lowing the bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra.21 
US Iraqi resettlement eff orts during this period of increas-
ing crisis can be characterized by a general dearth thereof: 
only 66 Iraqis were resettled in 2004, 198 in 2005, 202 in 
2006, and 1,607 in 2007.22
Ironically, the category of “refugee” was invoked repeat-
edly in early humanitarian justifi cations for the Iraq war via 
the trope of “return”—the post-war repatriation of some 
60,000 Iraqi refugees from the 1980s and 1990s.23 Th e rela-
tive invisibility of Iraqi fl ight during the immediate post-
war period allowed the US to focus its refugee-management 
faculties on these “returnees,” who tended to align them-
selves politically against the Ba’ath regime. Until 2006, State 
Department funding for displaced Iraqis prioritized return-
ees over Iraqis remaining in or fl eeing to nearby states.24 
Moreover, Iraqi “return” lent legitimacy to the common 
anti-resettlement argument of “brain drain,” the idea that 
displaced Iraqis should not be removed from the region lest 
their skills and expertise become permanently unavailable 
to the faltering Iraqi state-building project.25 Th e US gov-
ernment’s preferred solution for Iraqi refugees residing in 
neighbouring Arab countries has always been eventual 
repatriation, an option that is less costly in fi nancial and 
political terms than large-scale Iraqi resettlement to the 
United States.26
Finally, the US refused until 2009 to send resettlement 
representatives to Syria, which has hosted a plurality of 
internationally displaced Iraqis since 2003.27 Ongoing dis-
cursive combat between the US and the Syrian state dur-
ing the early 2000s—possibly compounded by the suspicion 
that Iraqis in Syria are more sympathetic to Ba’athist and 
anti-American platforms—resulted in strikingly low admis-
sions from Syria proportionate to the number of refugees 
residing there. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
offi  cials rejected “an unusually high percentage” of UNHCR 
referred refugees from Syria in 2007 without explanation, 
including 70 percent of women deemed in need of priority 
resettlement.28 Of 1,608 Iraqis resettled to the US that year, 
only 242 came from Syria.29
During the 2003–2007 period, the US did resettle hand-
fuls of Iraqis with professional links to the US government 
by way of a translator relocation project active in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Th ese early admissions were justifi ed in 
terms of maintaining US access to Iraqis with vital language 
skills; as US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker explained, a 
dearth of US assistance to former translators, contractors, 
and fi xers meant that fewer Iraqis would be willing to work 
with the US in the future.30 Yet these programs suff ered 
from severe administrative disarray—refugees were oft en 
asked to verify their service with documents to which they 
had no legal access31—and from the extensive Homeland 
Security protocols that prevented many refugees of Middle 
Eastern and Central Asian origin from reaching the US dur-
ing the early 2000s.32 Th e “enhanced security review” estab-
lished for Iraqis in 2003 was so exhaustive, and the percent-
age of Iraqis deemed “inadmissible” so large, that UNHCR 
briefl y stopped referring Iraqis to the United States.33 Th e 
“securitization” of US Iraqi resettlement in the immediate 
post-invasion period both compounded the general scarcity 
of resettlement places and justifi ed it, by promulgating a 
view of Iraqi refugees as potential arbiters of confl ict and 
terrorism. Th e concept of Iraqi refugee “rights” remained 
submerged in this discourse of “security” for several years 
onward, with detrimental eff ects on Iraqi admissions quotas 
to the United States.
US Admissions 2008–2011: Th e Strategic Imperative of 
Iraqi Resettlement
By the end of 2007, political pressure was mounting on the 
Bush administration to make broad changes to its policy of 
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minimal action regarding Iraqi refugees. Numerous high-
profi le journalistic and NGO reports emerged on the crisis, 
and refugee advocates in major research institutions argued 
for a special US responsibility to Iraqi refugees, above and 
beyond standard levels of funding and resettlement allo-
cated to other crises.34 Meanwhile, leading members of the 
newly Democratic Congress and Senate sought to reframe 
American political discourse on Operation Iraqi Freedom 
by initiating a series of committees examining its full 
range of humanitarian fallout. Th e refugee issue was front 
and centre. Invited to testify before Congress in late 2007, 
Director of Human Rights Watch’s Refugee Division Bill 
Frelick charged George Bush with abandoning the presiden-
tial tradition of incorporating refugee resettlement into cus-
tomary displays of American moral leadership on a global 
level. Addressing the resources already allocated to certain 
groups of Iraqi refugees, Frelick stated bluntly:
Band-aid assistance and token resettlement might make 
Americans feel less guilty about the destruction and suff ering this 
war has caused, but it will not be suffi  cient to make a diff erence 
in saving the lives of the vast majority of innocent civilians whose 
lives are still at risk.35
Yet accompanying this framework shift  in the terms 
of US humanitarian responsibility was a sharp discur-
sive recourse to the vocabulary of American interest and 
regional security. Th e prevalent concept of displaced Iraqis 
as a regional “confl ict contagion,”36 however inaccurate 
in terms of actual violence perpetrated by these refugees, 
drove home the potential of the refugee crisis to further 
endanger the Iraqi state-building process by destabilizing 
nearby countries, threatening US cooperation with their 
governments, and providing an ample recruitment pool 
for would-be insurgents. A bipartisan Iraq Study Group 
chaired by James Baker and Lee Hamilton warned that “Iraq 
and the region could be further destabilized” if immediate 
action was not taken to address the refugee crisis,37 and 
UNHCR offi  cials pleaded that rising volatility in Syria and 
Jordan stemmed from a lack of international burden-shar-
ing assistance.38 Th e Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, introduced 
by the late Senator Edward Kennedy in June 2007, cited the 
Baker-Hamilton conclusion and added: “If [refugees’] needs 
are not quickly and adequately met, these populations could 
become a fertile recruiting ground for terrorists.”39 By fram-
ing the Iraqi refugee crisis as a potent source of instability at 
a time when Iraq’s civil war was just beginning to subside, 
refugee advocates found a strategic justifi cation for Iraqi 
resettlement that resonated with the crisis-control tactics 
being deployed on the ground in Iraq. Resettlement once 
again became a diplomatic and strategic tool, rather than an 
under-resourced humanitarian sideshow.
Signed into law in February 2008, the Refugee Crisis in 
Iraq Act included several measures to increase and exped-
ite US resettlement of Iraqi refugees. In addition to raising 
resettlement ceilings for Iraqis in general, the bill author-
ized 5,000 annual Special Immigrant Visas (SIV), intended 
to cover US-affi  liated translators and contractors. Although 
the program has struggled to meet its quotas—641 visas 
were processed in FY 2008, and 3,028 in FY 2009—SIV 
admissions levels have been signifi cantly higher than those 
of previous translator relocation initiatives.40 Th e US also 
established Overseas Processing Entities (OPE) in Egypt, 
Jordan, and Iraq—later to be supplemented with offi  ces in 
Turkey, Lebanon, and Syria41—such that US-affi  liated Iraqis 
as well as families of special humanitarian concern could 
apply directly to the United States without passing through 
an external referent such as UNHCR.42 Although limited 
in capacity, the OPE offi  ce in Baghdad eliminates the need 
for certain well-placed refugee applicants to exit Iraq, an act 
that has become increasingly diffi  cult due to the restrictive 
border policies of nearby states. Iraqi resettlement increased 
nearly tenfold between 2007 and 2008, with 13,822 Iraqis 
making up nearly 23 percent of all US refugee admissions 
that year.43 As of May 2011, 58,811 Iraqis had been admitted 
under the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act.44
Lacking the previous administration’s imperative to 
defend US actions in Iraq, President Obama’s statements 
on the Iraqi refugee crisis have echoed the Baker-Hamilton 
report,45 blending humanitarian imperative with recog-
nition of strategic benefi ts. Newly elected, he referred to 
Iraqi refugees as “living consequences of this war,” stating 
that “America has a strategic interest—and a moral respon-
sibility—to act.”46 Th e Obama administration’s cautious 
reconciliation with Syria has also resulted in increased 
cooperation on behalf of Iraqi refugees, including the estab-
lishment of an OPE offi  ce in Damascus. While repatriation 
remains the US government’s preferred solution for Iraqi 
refugees, offi  cial reports have begun to reference UNHCR’s 
declarations that Iraq is not yet safe for large-scale return. 
According to the State Department’s 2011 Proposed Refugee 
Admissions report, “Th e long term US strategy for Iraq’s 
displaced is to help Iraq develop the capacity to reintegrate 
returning Iraqis into stable neighborhoods, while main-
taining resettlement for the most vulnerable”47
Problems remain, however, in the selection and integra-
tion of these “most vulnerable” due to ongoing structural 
ineffi  ciencies in US Iraqi resettlement. Although “secur-
ity” procedures for certain Iraqis—namely SIVs—were 
relaxed in 2007, the DHS continues to spar with the State 
Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration 
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(PRM) over the admissibility of certain Iraqis, resulting in 
an average processing period of 10 months.48 According to 
a Government Accountability Offi  ce report, USRAP lacks 
capacity for strategic planning as well as a mandate to 
demand any streamlining of the security vetting process.49 
Furthermore, USRAP bases its distribution of funds on 
past refugee fl ows, rather than present or projected ones;50 
funding levels in 2008 and 2009 therefore refl ected the far 
lower Iraqi resettlement quotas of 2006 and 2007,51 to the 
obvious detriment of the Iraqi admissions program. Th e 
US economic crisis and subsequent austerity measures have 
also aff ected USRAP, with the US FY 2010 budget allocating 
fewer funds for Migration and Refugee Assistance than the 
FY 2009 budget.52
As a result of these ongoing problems, scale-backs of tar-
get resettlement levels have been common in the post-2007 
era. In FY 2009, for example, the US government issued 
only 2,389 SIV visas out of an authorized 11,050.53 Th e fi s-
cal and organizational sloppiness of Iraqi refugee admis-
sions to the US implies that despite amended intentions vis-
à-vis the humanitarian fallout of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
Iraqi refugee resettlement has remained a secondary prior-
ity, trumped by the ongoing fi nancial and human resources 
allocated to US engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. And 
as critics of US resettlement are quick to point out, USRAP 
admissions have yet to make a sizable dent in the refugee 
crisis for which, they argue, the US maintains ultimate 
responsibility. As of 2010, Iraqis constituted the second 
largest refugee group worldwide, second only to displaced 
Afghanis.54
A “Race to the Bottom” or a Race to the Border? 
European Resettlement of Iraqis under CEAS
Whereas nearly all Iraqi refugees reach the United States by 
virtue of resettlement initiatives,55 UNHCR referrals and 
other overseas processing programs account for a small 
minority of European admissions from the MENA region. A 
large majority of Iraqis reach Europe by land or sea,56 claim-
ing asylum according to regulations set forth by individual 
states and by a series of EU directives pertaining to where, 
when, and on what grounds Iraqis may achieve refugee 
status. Iraqis have been seeking European asylum in large 
numbers since the 1990s,57 and have comprised Europe’s 
largest group of asylum seekers since 2007, accounting for 
some 38,000 or 17 percent of all applications.58
Th e 2003 dismantling of Saddam Hussein’s regime had 
little immediate impact on previous European policies of 
Iraqi asylum and resettlement, which have long remained 
a subset of Europe’s interior policy rather than its foreign 
relations. With the possible exception of the UK, the con-
temporary Iraqi refugee policies of EU states refl ect far less 
on the politics of regime change in Iraq than on the struc-
tural complexities and intra-European debates surrounding 
the construction of the Common European Asylum System. 
Inaugurated in 1999, the CEAS regime intends to increase 
burden-sharing among EU Member States through the 
“liberalization” and “harmonization”59 of their individual 
refugee protection standards, and to facilitate cooperation 
in regulating the movements of refugees into and around 
Europe.60 Th e past decade of EU resettlement policy can 
be characterized as an era of experimentation within these 
dual imperatives of liberalization and control, with Iraqi 
refugees serving as preliminary test subjects.
Some scholars of asylum have characterized European 
refugee policies in the contemporary era as a “race to the 
bottom,” 61 arguing that the 1986 evisceration of Europe’s 
internal borders set in motion a long-term process of states 
re-establishing population control by alternative means. By 
this logic, states that have lost the sovereign capacity to con-
trol population movement through their borders establish 
indirect methods of limiting migration, such as restrictive 
asylum criteria and low social benefi ts for non-Europeans. 
As states compete to redirect refugees towards their neigh-
bours, their policies become more and more illiberal, leaving 
asylum seekers with limited prospects for resettlement and 
integration. Other scholars have extended this line of ques-
tioning towards skepticism about the principles of CEAS, 
arguing that any “harmonized” multi-state asylum regime 
will eventually achieve the lowest common denominator, 
as states that are unfi t or unwilling to reform their asylum 
policies drive common protective standards ever lower. 
Satvinder S. Juss has described this shift  as one “from unco-
ordinated liberalism to harmonized restrictionism.”62
Some evidence from the experience of Iraqi refugees in 
Europe supports these arguments, particularly the resettle-
ment trajectory of Sweden, which has dismantled its exem-
plary Iraqi admissions program due in large part to the 
perceived burden-sharing failures of its neighbours. Indeed, 
UNHCR recently reported that “the relative importance of 
Europe as a destination for asylum-seekers has declined in 
recent years,” citing a precipitous drop in Europe’s share of 
asylum applications worldwide from 60 percent in 2005 to 
45 percent in 2009.63 But as I argue in the following sections, 
the present state of the European refugee regime does not 
corroborate fl aws in the theory of asylum policy integra-
tion so much as it refl ects on CEAS’s uneven implementa-
tion, where failures in the enforcement of “liberalization” 
coupled with an overt focus on “control” have narrowed the 
traditional options of asylum seekers prior to the fruition of 
sustainable alternatives.
In the following sections, I will detail the eff ects of stan-
dardization procedures and territorial control initiatives on 
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Iraqi asylum seekers since 2003. I argue that intra-European 
cooperation has been more eff ective in the latter category, 
with consequently greater impacts on prospects for Iraqi 
resettlement in Europe. I then review nascent European 
eff orts to “externalize” refugee policy along US lines by pri-
oritizing overseas refugee processing—as opposed to the 
traditional European model of processing asylum seekers 
aft er their arrival to EU territory—and by employing for-
eign policy tools to impact the number of refugees arriving 
at Europe’s borders.
Standardized and/or Liberalized? Iraqi Refugees and 
Asylum Policy Harmonization
In keeping with the agenda of asylum liberalization, the 
European Parliament supports the prima facie refugee 
status bestowed by UNHCR on refugees from southern and 
central Iraq. A 2007 resolution centred on improving the 
reception of Iraqis in Europe and standardizing EU Iraqi 
refugee response protocol called on Member States to “[o]
vercome their position of non-action regarding the situa-
tion of Iraqi refugees and to fulfi ll their obligations under 
international and community law to give Iraqis in Member 
States the opportunity to lodge asylum applications.”
Yet Iraqi recognition rates since the height of the crisis 
have varied widely, from some 82 percent in Sweden and 85 
percent in Germany to 13 percent in the UK and less than 
1 percent in Slovenia and Greece.64 Resettlement levels and 
percentages tend to be highest in Nordic states, while south-
ern and eastern European states reject far more applicants 
than they resettle. Britain presents a somewhat unique case, 
based both on its active involvement in the Iraq war and 
on its sensitivity to projects of European policy harmon-
ization.65 UK asylum recognition rates are far lower than 
those of other European states within the same wealth 
bracket, and the UK’s translator relocation program is far 
weaker than Denmark’s, which admitted nearly 100 percent 
of its quota within a year following the Danish withdrawal 
from Iraq.66 EU directives pertaining to policy harmon-
ization allow “a wide amount of discretion and fl exibility 
in a large number of areas,”67 noting ongoing variation in 
recognition criteria, in the condition of detention centres 
and hosting facilities, and in refugee access to employment. 
In short, Member States continue to base their Iraqi asy-
lum policies on unique national priorities rather than the 
EU agenda of “harmonization” and “liberalization”; while 
some are unilaterally liberal, others fall short. A 2011 report 
by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles expressed 
acute disappointment with CEAS’s harmonization progress, 
describing the current state of asylum in Europe as “not the 
progress that we hoped for.”68
Th e recent history of Sweden’s Iraqi asylum regime dem-
onstrates the ongoing failure of asylum policy harmoniza-
tion in Europe and its corrosive eff ects on states with gen-
erous admissions policies.69 Sweden by 2006 had granted 
protection to more Iraqis than all other Member States 
combined,70 earning a reputation as Europe’s most generous 
country of Iraqi asylum. Sweden was also foremost among 
European governments urging fellow Member States to lib-
eralize their own asylum policies so as to spread the burden 
of asylum processing more evenly.71 When these calls went 
unheeded, Swedish offi  cials spoke out against the idea that 
Swedish policy is “more liberal” towards Iraqis than other 
European states, complaining that the resulting “pull factor” 
had caused asylum applications in Sweden to rise to unman-
ageable levels.72 Policy modifi cations followed; a 2008 rul-
ing established that Iraqis had to prove individual persecu-
tion in order to qualify for Swedish resettlement, driving 
Sweden’s recognition rate for that year down to 40 percent.73 
From 2007 to 2009, Sweden’s share of Iraqi resettlement in 
Europe dropped from 64 percent to 13 percent,74 a trend 
attributed by UNHCR to “a drop in recognition rates and 
a potential shift  in fl ows from Sweden to its neighbors.”75 
Sweden continues overseas resettlement of Iraqis on a rela-
tively generous scale,76 suggesting that Stockholm is not 
opposed to admission of Iraqis per se but has rather sought 
to counteract the pull factor driving Iraqis in Europe to set 
their sights on Sweden alone.
Th e apparent failure of CEAS to “trim national infl u-
ence”77 in asylum policy can be attributed to the weakness of 
positive measures intended to incentive harmonization. Th e 
European Asylum Support Offi  ce (EASO) facilitates infor-
mational exchange and practical cooperation among states 
already keen on Iraqi resettlement, but cannot take a role 
in the decision-making processes of individual states.78 Th e 
European Resettlement Fund (ERF), from which Member 
States can request up to 4,000 euros per head to assist in 
resettlement costs,79 has also proved too weak to incentiv-
ize more protective policies. Eiko R. Th ielemann calls the 
ERF “symbolism rather than substance,” a small consola-
tion prize for Europe’s southern and border states, many of 
which oppose asylum policy harmonization.80 Moreover, 
asylum seekers in Europe contend with post-9/11 security 
protocols that mirror American laws in language and eff ect, 
such as a December 2001 ruling requiring Member States to 
vet asylum applicants “for the purpose of ensuring that the 
asylum seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in 
the commission of terrorist acts.”81 Th e elasticity of this law 
as it pertains to Iraqi migrants has allowed several European 
states—including both wealthy governments such as the 
UK and less resourced ones such as Greece—to justify the 
indefi nite detention of Iraqis under auspices of the “vetting” 
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process.82 CEAS’s institutions lack the enforcement cap-
acity to intervene.
Th e Territorial Prerogative: Iraqi Refugees and Europe’s 
Borders
Whereas the US maintains de facto territorial control vis-
à-vis infl ows of Iraqi refugees, Europe’s geographical prox-
imity to the Middle East and its uniquely porous internal 
borders have shaped a strong European concern with con-
trolling the physical movement of migrants and asylum 
seekers into and around Europe. A central goal of CEAS is 
to enhance collective control of Europe’s peripheral borders 
such that the weak law-enforcement systems of southern 
European states might cease to facilitate unregulated entry 
to the EU. Further initiatives have focused on forestalling 
“secondary movements”83 of asylum seekers between 
Member States, both positively (through the harmoniza-
tion eff orts described in the previous section) and through 
prohibitive regulations on refugee movement. Reduced 
access to European territory and reduced movement within 
Europe are therefore two of the greatest factors shaping the 
experiences of Iraqi asylum seekers in Europe.
Numerous studies of CEAS have found greater concen-
trations of fi scal and organizational resources allocated to 
“control” initiatives as opposed to “harmonizing” ones.84 
Europe continues to strengthen the mandate of FRONTEX, 
its border control agency, in terms of patrolling capacity, 
detention facilities, and cooperation with the security 
forces of states such as Turkey, a major country of transit 
for Iraqis en route to Europe.85 Th e EC has also launched 
regional cooperative border patrols such as RABIT, a coali-
tion of guards from Member States gathered in 2010 to assist 
the Greek government in forestalling “illegal” migration.86 
Both FRONTEX and RABIT lack specifi c mandates vis-à-
vis the recognition of asylum seekers, leading rights groups 
to speculate about violations of Iraqi non-refoulement on 
Europe’s borders. Amnesty International in 2009 reported 
on FRONTEX’s “targeting” of Iraqi “illegal migrants,” 
implying that contrary to the European Parliament’s sup-
port for prima facie status, at least some Iraqis are not being 
considered as asylum seekers upon arrival to Europe’s 
borders.87
Europe has also expanded its means of deterritorialized 
migration control, including complicated visa regulations—
to enter Europe legally, Iraqis need a G-series passport only 
available in Baghdad88—and fi nes for airline carriers trans-
porting unregistered migrants to Europe.89 Aside from 
outsourcing the preliminary steps of the asylum recogni-
tion process to foreign bureaucracies and private companies, 
these control mechanisms have resulted in an incremental 
“criminalization” of asylum seeking, where refugees oft en 
have to break the law in order to reach Member States where 
they can claim asylum.90 While international refugee law 
contains no specifi c language prohibiting either of these 
regulations, policies that confl ate UN-recognized asylum 
seekers with illegal migrants violate the non-penalization 
clause of the Refugee Convention, which obliges states not to 
“impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or pres-
ence, on refugees who … enter or are present in the terri-
tory without authorization.”91 Application levels to Europe 
in the late 2000s have refl ected the increasing diffi  culty of 
reaching European territory. From 2009 to 2010, Iraqi asy-
lum applications to EU states dropped by 19 percent.92
Foremost among EU policies regulating the internal 
movement of Iraqi asylum seekers is the Dublin II regula-
tion, which stipulates that a refugee must apply for asylum 
to the European country in which he or she fi rst sets foot, 
and allows Member States to deport asylum candidates back 
to their original state of entry. Dublin II was introduced in 
2005 to counteract the phenomenon of “asylum shopping”—
where refugees travel through Europe in search of a hos-
pitable asylum regime—thereby counteracting the magnet 
eff ect of liberal regimes such as Sweden’s. In reality, Dublin 
II has increased pressure on the weak asylum regimes of 
Europe’s southern and border states, where protection 
standards have fallen even lower as a result of functioning 
overcapacity.
Opponents of the Dublin II regime cite the case of Greece, 
whose border with Turkey and 18,400 kilometres of coast-
line are major points of entry for Iraqis seeking EU asylum. 
Dublin II’s implementation caused a major surge of asylum 
applications to Greece; levels increased by 105 percent from 
2006 to 2007, at a time when applications to Europe overall 
rose only 11 percent. (Out of 25,000 applicants to Greece 
in 2007, some 5,500 were Iraqi.93) Th e EASO has attempted 
to improve Greece’s protective standards and its asylum-
processing capacity using a volunteer team of Member State 
“consultants,” while the RABIT program has somewhat suc-
cessfully decreased the number of asylum seekers for whom 
Greece is the initial point of entry.94 Yet Greek recognition 
rates for Iraqis continue to hover below 1 percent,95 and a 
series of high-profi le NGO reports have condemned the 
ongoing detention, deportation, and abuse of Iraqis and 
other refugees in Greece.96 Little more than fi ve years into 
Dublin II’s lifespan, both UNHCR and the European Court 
of Human Rights have issued statements urging Member 
States to suspend the transfer of asylum seekers to Greece. 
(Norway, Sweden, and Finland had already begun doing so 
of their own accord.97) Collaboration in the prevention of 
Dublin II deportations to Greece is a small yet welcome sign 
of protective “harmonization” among EU states, but one 
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which nonetheless highlights the failure of CEAS and the 
EASO to eff ect liberalization in the most dire of scenarios.
According to the ECRE, Dublin II is “based on the 
myth that protection standards are equivalent throughout 
the EU,”98 in which case an asylum seeker’s obligation to 
apply to one state or another would have little bearing on 
his chances of achieving refugee status. Yet Dublin II’s pre-
mature application to Europe’s present-day asylum system 
eff ectively mandates asylum applications to states with clear 
records of migrant abuse. Dublin II epitomizes CEAS’s mis-
guided implementation, where burden-sharing mechan-
isms based on the restriction of refugee movement—rather 
than the reform of Member State policies—result in the 
deterioration, rather than liberalization, of refugees’ rights 
in Europe. Just as border control initiatives “criminalize” 
the process of arriving to Europe, Dublin II puts the onus 
on refugees, rather than governments, to eff ect greater equi-
librium in application levels among European states.
Whither Asylum? Iraqi Refugees and “Externalization”
Despite Europe’s long-standing reputation as a continent of 
asylum rather than overseas processing and resettlement, 
the border-tightening measures discussed above as well as 
recent initiatives in overseas processing may suggest a grad-
ual shift  in Europe’s refugee policy towards the American 
model.99 Th e prospect of “externalizing” European refugee 
policy has gained traction among policy makers who view 
overseas processing and foreign policy action to address “root 
causes” of refugee fl ows as alternatives to a liberal European 
asylum regime.100 “Externalization” holds both positive 
and negative possibilities for the rights of Iraqi refugees in 
Europe. While it is still too early to determine whether this 
nascent trend will take root, it is fair to say that the outcomes 
of “externalization” will depend, like CEAS, on the means 
and the priorities by which it is implemented.
Recent European resettlement initiatives have framed 
extraterritorial processing—European missions mimick-
ing the US OPE offi  ces—as a proactive substitute for open 
borders, one which would establish greater control over 
levels of Iraqis and other refugees in the European process-
ing system.101 Direct resettlement from host states such as 
Syria and Lebanon has indeed increased since the onset of 
the crisis; whereas 8 Member States admitted 3,300 Iraqis 
in 2007 and 2008 combined, 12 EU countries off ered 5,100 
resettlement spots in 2009 alone.102 Following a 2008 Justice 
and Home Aff airs Council decision that Member States 
should jointly resettle 10,000 Iraqi refugees “on a voluntary 
basis,”103 several states with no prior Iraqi resettlement pro-
grams began accepting UNHCR referrals. During that same 
year, Germany and France signed ad hoc agreements with 
UNHCR, agreeing to resettle some 500 to 2,000 Iraqis each 
according to specifi c criteria laid out by those governments. 
Both states initially expressed preference for “minority” 
Iraqis, though they amended this criterion to focus on the 
“most vulnerable,” such as female-headed households.104 
Th e growing European preference for joint resettlement 
programs, rather than asylum policy harmonization, points 
to a desire for greater control over the Iraqi admissions pro-
cess. States can maintain individualized admissions criteria 
while cooperating on the structural level to facilitate the 
selection and transportation of refugees.
Th e popularity of multilateral interventions in the early 
1990s raised the prospect of “prevention” as an element of 
refugee policy, where Western states would act preemptively 
to halt refugee-producing confl icts before the onset of mass 
emigration.105 While policy formulation along the lines 
of “prevention” has always been limited, the use of foreign 
aid, bilateral agreements, and other foreign policy tools to 
preclude refugee movements remains a popular principle in 
European thought, if not an active one in European policy. 
Foreign aid to Syria and Jordan to assist in provision for dis-
placed Iraqis predates the Joint Resettlement Initiative by 
several years,106 though at levels insuffi  cient to impact the 
need for third-country resettlement. Other bilateral initia-
tives of a more manipulative nature provide fi scal support to 
the border fortifi cation programs of major refugee sending 
states; prior to the 2011 NATO action against the Gaddafi  
regime, for example, several European states were con-
ducting negotiations with Libya over a framework agree-
ment to stop seaborne departures to Europe.107 Such part-
nerships under the guise of “externalization” have prompted 
rights groups to challenge the direction of Europe’s refugee 
and asylum policy, accusing the EU of seeking to seques-
ter asylum seekers abroad regardless of the validity of their 
claims.
Conclusion: Asylum, Resettlement, and the Future 
of Iraq’s Refugees
Aside from highlighting divergence in their political pos-
itionalities vis-à-vis Iraq and the surrounding region, 
comparing US and EU Iraqi refugee admissions demon-
strates the structural dissimilarity between in-country 
asylum systems and resettlement via overseas processing. 
“Resettlement” is a top-down process that facilitates the pol-
itical manipulation of refugee fl ows; admissions levels can 
very easily be expanded, decreased, or halted altogether, as 
the United States has done vis-à-vis Iraqis since the 1990s. 
Asylum, by comparison, is messy. Th e relatively open bor-
ders that characterize asylum systems diminish host-state 
control over the numbers, nationalities, and other char-
acteristics of potential new residents, and raise diffi  cult 
questions about the legal status of failed asylum seekers 
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who remain in host-state territory. States that liberalize 
their asylum policies can fi nd themselves overwhelmed by 
unregistered migrants, whose claims upon the state neces-
sitate an independent infrastructure of courts, bureaucracy, 
and hosting facilities. Th e fi scal and sociopolitical cost of 
asylum can grate harshly on the tolerance of host state 
populations; Sweden’s election of a right wing, anti-migrant 
government in 2006 provides a stark example. If US deci-
sions regarding Iraqi refugee admissions seem compara-
tively straightforward, it is because resettlement via over-
seas processing allows for a unique level of state control over 
the refugee admission process.
Yet asylum as an institution more closely mirrors the 
goals of the UN Refugee Convention, where the right of 
persecuted individuals to cross international borders is not 
contingent on the political whims of a particular host state. 
Th e comparative visibility of refugees in asylum systems 
obliges action on the part of the host state, whereas states 
that practice overseas processing only can easily ignore 
mounting need in remote places such as Syria, Lebanon, and 
Jordan, states whose refugee-to-population ratios are some 
of the highest on earth. Th e Bush administration’s delib-
erate blind eye towards Iraqi refugees from 2003 through 
2007 exemplifi es the easy subjugation of refugee rights to 
host-state interests in systems of overseas resettlement. Had 
a handful of European states not maintained generous asy-
lum policies for Iraqis during these years, options for Iraqi 
resettlement worldwide would have been scarce indeed.
For these reasons, the growing European preoccupa-
tion with border fortifi cation and deterritorialized migrant 
control is a worrisome trend. Th ough the referenced “lib-
eral European asylum tradition” is somewhat mythological, 
Europe has historically served as an important site of asy-
lum for refugees that the US has not considered strategically 
important. A prospective lockdown on Europe’s periphery—
to say nothing of partnerships aimed at sequestering asy-
lum seekers in states with known records of migrant abuse—
heralds an eff ective end to European asylum. As the ECRE 
points out, “Th e best protection regime will be of little use if 
refugees are unable to reach the EU’s territory.”108 Th ough 
it remains unclear whether “externalization” will overtake 
asylum as Europe’s primary model of refugee management, 
it is certain that overseas processing will have to increase 
dramatically if the overall eff ects of externalization are not 
to be severely deliberalizing.
Doing justice to the topic of Iraqi asylum in the EU 
requires investigating the unprecedented eff ects of the 
Single Europe Act on the concept of territorial sovereignty 
in Europe and on corresponding regimes of migration 
and asylum. Some view the CEAS’s failure to “harmonize” 
European asylum as a referendum on European territorial 
integration, where previously unilateral choices relating to 
migration and resettlement have become a de facto point of 
intra-European tension and debate. Th e CEAS framework 
institutionalized these debates rather than resolving them, 
and the decisive lack of “harmonization” progress during 
the program’s inaugural decade speaks to the tenacity with 
which many Member States seek to maintain individual 
policies of asylum.
Achieving burden sharing in the Schengen context 
requires both facets of CEAS “cooperation”; Europe’s per-
ipheral border must be regulated (though not closed off ), 
and asylum policies must be integrated (if not harmonized) 
to avoid future asylum shutdowns such as Sweden’s. Yet 
comparing the impact of institutions such as the European 
Refugee Fund with regulations such as Dublin II reveals 
the weakness of the CEAS’s “liberalization” and “harmon-
ization” measures as compared to their control-oriented 
counterparts. Moreover, the underwhelming outcome of 
EASO’s intervention in Greece demonstrates that harmon-
ization initiatives without enforcement mechanisms have 
little possibility of success. Many scholars pay homage to 
the “norm of protection”109 promulgated by European insti-
tutions, but that norm’s bearing on the experience of refu-
gees is strictly a matter of implementation.
Finally, comparing US and EU policies vis-à-vis Iraqi 
refugees raises questions about states’ accountability for 
refugee-producing policies, and about the corresponding 
levels of aid and resettlement required to off set this “respon-
sibility”. While Europeans opposed to Iraqi resettlement 
have argued that the US should have sole responsibility for 
Iraqis’ humanitarian needs, Bush offi  cials have justifi ed 
policies of minimal resettlement through a causational de-
linking of the US invasion and the ensuing refugee crisis. 
Th e ambiguity of “responsibility” for refugee crises may be 
one reason why the UN Refugee Convention places no onus 
on “responsible parties” to shoulder the burden of refugee 
aid and resettlement alone. Indeed, “burden-sharing” favors 
the even distribution of refugee hosting among Convention 
signatory states—according to capacity, and without any 
consideration of guilt.
Still, it is worth re-examining the arguments of US refugee 
experts who were able to transpose demands for a “special 
responsibility” towards recognition of a “particular interest” 
in Iraqi resettlement. As the primary international party 
invested militarily and fi nancially in the fl ailing Iraqi state-
building project, the US has fi nally become—as it should 
have been from the outset—foremost among states work-
ing towards the gradual resolution of the Iraqi refugee crisis. 
As evidenced by the resettlement of nearly 100,000 refugees 
per year in the 1990s,110 the United States has extremely 
high capacity for refugee absorption. While organizational 
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failures can determine the frequency with which US admin-
istrations meet their own resettlement objectives, refugee 
quotas themselves refl ect calculations of pure international 
political interest. Iraqi refugee admissions to the US since 
2003 have been—for better and worse—inseparable from 
the broader goals and strategic imperatives of US involve-
ment in Iraq. So long as the mass displacement of Iraqis 
continues to impact social and political stability in Iraq and 
her neighbouring states, we can expect US resettlement of 
Iraqis to continue on a broad scale.
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